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DISTRIBUTED TRUSTED UPDATE APPROVAL 
ABSTRACT 
 An automatic update system is described that enables a user to elect one or more security 
delegates that the automatic update system extracts opinions from, regarding software and 
firmware updates.  The automatic update system may compare the opinion of security delegates 
with an update installation policy associated with each delegate.  The automatic update system 
may use the delegate opinions when confronted with a decision to accept (e.g., download) and 
optionally install an update to determine whether to install or reject the update, despite whether 
the update is or is not received from a trusted source.   
BACKGROUND 
Most computing systems will at some point require a software or firmware update to one 
or more applications and platforms executing at the systems.  An update, as described herein, is 
not simply an update to a different software version but the installation of a new incarnation of 
the underlying software or firmware executing at the system, typically identified by a respective 
manufacturer signature and/or hash.  Automatically installing a malicious or defective update 
(e.g., an update that includes malware, viruses, trojans, etc.) can compromise the integrity of a 
system and potentially render the system unusable.  Some systems may infer that an update is 
free from defects if the update originated from a trusted source (e.g., an original application 
developer or manufacturer of the system) and therefore only install updates that arrive from a 
trusted source. 
To verify that an update is received from a trusted source, some systems look for a crypto 
key with the update and validate the key back to original application developer or manufacturer 
before automatically installing the update.  However crypto keys can be stolen and replicated.  In 
addition, a previously trusted source can become compromised, as even seemingly reputable 
application developers or manufacturers can be coerced by third parties to introduce backdoors, 
malicious code, or other defects into an installation package (e.g., for corporate espionage, 
government surveillance, etc.).  Therefore, even if a system recognizes an update as being safe 
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for installation, because the systems deems the update to have originated from a “trusted source”, 
the update may still be compromised and its installation may damage the integrity of the system.   
Sometimes, either through experience with a particular update, information in the news, 
or other information, a user or someone the user knows or otherwise trusts, may have a better 
idea as to which software and firmware updates can be trusted, and which sources or updates are 
potentially compromised.  Unfortunately, most users do not have the resources, technical 
aptitude, or desire to review, based on their judgement, every system update before installation; 
doing so, would negate the convenience of having a system that automatically perform updates 
on its own.  
DESCRIPTION 
 An update system is described that enables a user to elect one or more security delegates 
(e.g., a person, a group, a company, an organization, or other entity that the user trusts) that the 
automatic update system extracts opinions from, regarding software and firmware updates.  The 
update system may evaluate the opinion of security delegates when confronted with a decision to 
accept (e.g., download) and optionally install an update.  That is, the update system may use the 
delegate opinions to determine whether to install or reject the update, despite whether the update 
is or is not received from a trusted source.  By relying on the opinions of trusted delegates, the 
update system may inherit the experience of a user or experience of trustworthy people and 
organizations that the user is aware of, to make better decisions on whether to install an update 
without compromising the integrity or security of the system.   In this way, even if other systems 
would automatically install the update based on an inference that the update originated from a 
seemingly trusted source, the example update system described herein can apply additional 
scrutiny using knowledge and opinion of security delegates to reduce the chance of installing a 
defective update.   
 Consider update system 1 (referred to simply as “system 1”), shown below in FIG. 1 that 
includes an example device configured to determine whether to install an update from a server 
system, in accordance with the techniques described herein.  System 1 includes distribution 
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server system 20 (referred to simply as “server 20”) and delegate server system 40 (referred to 
simply as “server 40”) each in communication, via network 30, with computing device 10 
(referred to simply as “device 10”).  Although described below as being implemented across 
three separate devices, the techniques described herein could be implemented as part of any 
combination of one or more devices or servers communicating across a network.  For example, 
delegate server system 40 may not necessarily be a stand-alone system and instead may exist as a 
part of subcomponent of device 10 or server 20. 
 
 Network 30 represents a combination of any one or more public or private 
communication networks, for instance, television broadcast networks, cable or satellite networks, 
cellular networks, Wi-Fi networks, broadband networks, and/or other type of network for 
transmitting data (e.g., telecommunications and/or media data) between various computing 
devices, systems, and other communications and media equipment.  Devices 10 and servers 20 
may each send and receive data across network 30 using any suitable communication techniques.   
 Server 20 communicates via network 30 with device 10 for sending and receiving 
information, to and from devices located on network 30, such as device 10.  Server 20 includes 
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update distribution module 22 which is configured to distribute software or firmware updates to 
devices on network 30, including device 10.  For example, server 20 may be owned or operated 
by a particular software developer or device manufacturer.   
Module 22 may provide a service from which devices on network 30, such as computing 
device 10, can receive installation packages for updating the software developed by the particular 
software developer or device manufacturer that owns or operates server 20.  Module 22 may sign 
each installation package distributed on network 30 with a crypto key so that a device that 
receives the installation package can confirm that the package originated from server 20 and not 
a counterfeit or impersonating source.  
Server 40 communicates via network 30 with device 10 for sending and receiving 
information pertaining security delegates and their respective opinions.  Server 40 includes 
delegate opinions 42 and provides a service from which devices connected to network 30 can 
publish or access information pertaining security delegate opinions related to an update.  For 
example, unlike other systems that simply look to a crypto key or other way to validate that a 
source of an update is a trusted developer or manufacturer, module 12 requires access to the 
information stored at server 40 in order to determine whether to install an update or not.   
Delegate opinions 42 each represent respective opinions of security delegates that are 
explicitly trusted by users.  Each delegate opinion 42 may have information pertaining to the 
validity and recommendation for installing any or all updates.  For example, a delegate opinion 
may include information about whether the delegate regards a particular update as being 
trustworthy and/or free from defects.  An opinion may include information such as: “Verified: 
Good update”, “Verified: Bad update”, “In Verification”, “Not Verified”, etc.  An opinion may 
further include information as to whether the delegate installed the update or not, for example, 
“Installed”, “Never Installed”, “Installed but removed”. Additional information contained in an 
opinion might include a percentage or quantity of devices the delegate decided to install or not 
install an update.  The information associate with each of delegate opinions 42 may be used by 
devices and users of devices connected to network 30 to determine if the specific updates are 
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should be installed or not.  An example of a table data structure associated with one of delegate 
opinions 42 is shown below in Table 1. 
TABLE 1 
 
It should be understood that in some cases, an application developer or manufacturer may 
publish (e.g., via an application programming interface [API] or a web-presence) their own 
delegate opinion 42 with regards to any particular update.  For instance, by default the opinion of 
a manufacturer’s own update would be “Accepted” but the manufacturer could in some instances 
blacklist some of their software if the manufacture later learns that the code has been 
compromised or is otherwise defective (e.g., after identifying a security risk or flaw).  A 
searchable view like the one below in Table 2 could be exposed to customers: 
TABLE 2 
 
Device 10 represents any type computing device that requires automatic software or 
firmware updates.  Device 10 includes update management module 12 and delegate policies 14.  
Examples of device 10 include mobile devices, such as mobile phones, tablet computers, 
wearable devices (e.g., computerized eyewear, wristwatches, and fitness trackers), laptop 
computers, and automobiles.  Additional examples of device 10 include non-mobile devices, 
such as desktop computers, servers, televisions, home automation devices, thermostats, set-top-
boxes, media players, and the like.  Device 10 can be a personal, a corporate, an organizational, 
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  Module 12 may manage the automatic download and installation of software and 
firmware updates that device 10 received via network 30.  Module 12 may be a part of an 
operating system or platform of computing device 10 or may be a part of or subcomponent of an 
application executing at device 10.  Module 12 may rely on delegate policies 14 and access to 
delegate opinions 42 of server 40 to determine whether to install a software or firmware update 
prior to or after downloading the update from server 20. 
Module 12 may execute a policy engine that accesses delegate policies 14 and cross-
references delegate policies 14 with the delegate opinions obtained from the service provided by 
server 40.  That is, module 12 may receive opinions associated with security delegates that the 
policy engine identifies in delegate policies 14, and use the opinions and policies 14 for making 
determinations whether to install updates received over network 30.  As an example, the policy 
engine of module 12 could evaluate a list of delegates provided by policies 14 to determine 
whether any number of delegates has an opinion regarding installing or not installing an update.  
In response to identifying a match between a delegate opinion from a delegate specified in one or 
more of policies 14 with regard to a particular update, module 12 may install or refrain from 
installing the update, accordingly.  The policy engine may operate under the assumption that a 
user of device 10 is always in control.  In other words, module 12 may allow users to always be 
able to override any recommendation from their delegates and direct module 12 to “install this 
update” or “never install this update” regardless as to the information received from server 40. 
In operation, module 12 may initially require a user of device 10 to specify one or more 
delegates and one or more delegate groups that module 12 stores as policies 14.  Each delegate 
may be: a specific known user (e.g., from a contacts list), a specific e-mail account, a specific 
group on a social media platform, a specific individual or group from a domain, etc.  Module 12 
may require the user to specify a policy with regards to each delegate or delegate group.  For 
example, as shown below in Table 3 provides an example policy of three different delegate 
groups that may be stored as individual policies 14: 
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 Group #1 
Delegates: security_operations@firstdomain.com (level: guru) 
  corporate_operations@firstdomain.com (level: expert) 
Scope: All software from *.firstdomain.com 
Action: Accept if approved by all delegates 
 Group #2 
Delegates Joe “Tin Foil Hat” Smith (level: guru) 
  Company Founder (level: guru) 
  Co-workers in industry (level: guru) 
Scope: Any software 
Action: Accept if approved by 2+ delegates 
    
 Group #3 
Delegates All my friends in my social media group called “Techie Friends” 
Scope: All software from *.famoussoftwaredeveloperitrust.com 
Action: Accept if installed by 80%+ of my friends 
 
In some cases, module 12 may operate according to a default policy, if a user does not 
provide any delegates or policies with respect to the delegates.  For example, as shown in Table 
4 below, an example default policy stored as one of policies 14 and relied on by module 12 in an 
example where no delegates are specified by the user could be: 
TABLE 4 
Default Policy   
Delegates: Manufacturer (level: expert) 
Scope: All software, except explicitly listed in other policies 
Action: Accept if approved by 1 expert 
ACME 
Products   
Delegates: ACME Trusted Verifier [trustedclient@----acme.com] (level: expert) 
Scope: All software from *.----acme.com 
Action: Accept if approved by 1 expert 
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In some instances, module 12 may allow a user to specify a global policy as one of 
policies 14 with regards to all delegates.  For example, module 12 may allow a user to specify a 
“panic button” or a “global policy” to cause, for example, module 12 to reject an uninstall if any 
delegate has an opinion that the update is particularly harmful.  In addition to setting actions 
within policies 14, module 12 may be configured to allow a user to set a policy to “warn” 
instead, once a potential update matches a policy.  For example, module 12 may determine that 
an update is a healthy and trusted update ready for installation, but because of the “warning” 
policy, module 12 may still stop and request explicit user permissions before performing the 
installation. 
 In any event, module 12 may compare the delegate opinions obtained from server 40 to 
the policies 14 maintained with regard to each delegate, to determine whether any delegate has a 
relevant opinion about a particular install.  Module 12 may install or not install an update, based 
on the determination. 
In this way, the described techniques may enable a new ecosystem for software and 
firmware update enabling developers and manufacturers to elect to verify and vouch for software 
they care about.  There already exists information technology specialist that specialize in 
managing software updates and installation, performing security audits, and handling other types 
of information management jobs.  These same information technology specialists may leverage 
the described techniques to provide additional software validation services.  Ultimately, the end 
user is left in charge of deciding whether import the policies of a validation service or otherwise 
decide who to trust and how.  Furthermore, while some developers and manufacturers tend to 
restrict which third parties are allowed to develop software for their respective systems and 
platforms, other developers and manufacturers enable users to freely install software from any 
developer that the user chooses.  As a natural extension to the free install methodology, the 
described techniques may now enable users to make better decisions by leveraging and providing 
their own opinions on the security and safety of otherwise available software. 
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